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INTRODUCTION
The Hague Conference on Private International Law’s
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
1
of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Convention) went into force in the
2
United States in April 2008. The aim of the Hague Convention is to
provide needed regulation for intercountry adoption.3 However, this
Note questions whether the Hague Convention is actually
accomplishing its goals and whether the best interests of children are
actually being met. The Hague Convention seeks to provide
standards for and transparency of the intercountry adoption process,
but while the aims are honorable, the practical reality is that children
may be negatively affected. Preferred countries for intercountry
adoption, such as China, Romania, Guatemala, and Vietnam, have
reacted to global scrutiny by tightening their regulations and in some
cases closing their borders altogether. Examining such countries will
Copyright © 2009 by Rebecca Worthington.
 Rebecca Worthington is a J.D. candidate at Duke University School of Law and an Articles
Editor of the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law. She received her B.A. from
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1. Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, May 19, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-51, 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
2. Intercountry Adoption Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–54 (2000).
3. One of the stated objects of the Hague convention is “to establish safeguards to ensure
that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child and with respect for his
or fundamental rights as recognized in international law.” Hague Convention, supra note 1, art.
1. The Hague Convention seeks to ensure that children grow up in a family environment if
possible, while simultaneously protecting against the harms that can arise when a country allows
intercountry adoption, such as trafficking. Id.
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provide insight into how the Hague Convention is affecting children.
The system does indeed need safeguards, but at what cost?
This Note argues that the Hague Convention process
inadequately protects vulnerable children. Part I discusses the need
for reforms in intercountry adoption. Part II focuses on how the
Hague Convention seeks to implement such reforms, and how current
regulations are not ensuring that the best interests of children are
realized. Part III, by looking at specific countries, demonstrates how
restricting intercountry adoption can lead to less than optimal results
for children. Finally, Part IV briefly suggests a proposal to remedy the
flaws in the current Hague Convention.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION
Due to its high demand for children, the United States is a major
player in intercountry adoptions and has been for quite some time.
Potential American parents have looked outside the country as the
4
availability of domestic infants has waned. The United States issued
immigrant visas to 19,613 orphans in 2007, which is almost three times
5
as many visas as it issued in 1990.
An orphaned child in need of a permanent home and family is
not a new phenomenon. The phenomenon of intercountry adoption
took off after World War II and grew in the following decades as
natural disasters, wars, and the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic left increasing numbers of now6
orphaned children without traditional family care. Even with
increased numbers of orphans, a country’s decision whether or not to

4. Margaret Liu, International Adoptions: An Overview, 8 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 187,
190 (1994) (suggesting that the “imbalance of supply and demand” in America, which has made
those seeking to adopt turn to intercountry adoption, is caused by, among other things, the rise
of contraceptive use, the legalization of abortion, and greater societal acceptance and support of
single parent families with the growth of the welfare state); Kevin D. Williamson, Lost
Generation, NAT’L REV., Aug. 4, 2008, at 34-36 (arguing that a major side effect of Roe v. Wade
has been that “[w]ould-be parents trek to the Far East and mount expeditions to South America
because there are so few infants available for adoption in the United States” since the landmark
Supreme Court case “ensured that those babies who survived to birth were born to women who
were much less likely to choose adoption”).
5. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE
2007, tbl. XIII, http://travel.state.gov/pdf/fy07AnnualReportTableXIII.pdf (last visited Apr. 1,
2008).
6. Liu, supra note 4, at 187-92. This Note uses the term “orphan” broadly, referring both
to children, under the age of eighteen, whose parents have died and vulnerable, abandoned
children.
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allow its children to be adopted internationally often depends on its
7
current political and social situation. The usual suspects with high
rates of intercountry adoptions are often poor and economically
unstable.8 Sub-Saharan Africa is reported to have the highest
proportion of orphans, but the “absolute numbers of orphans are
9
much higher in Asia.” While exact numbers are hard to come by,
estimates from 2003 showed 143 million orphans “in 93 countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean,” with
roughly 15 million of those orphaned due to the HIV/AIDS
epidemic.10 Generally, wealthy countries are the receivers of adopted
children, while underdeveloped and developing countries are the
11
12
senders. Furthermore, a serious supply and demand problem exists.
Healthy infants are in high demand, with many potential parents
reluctant to adopt older children or ones with special needs. While
the same demand (if not higher) exists for adopted children as it did a
few years ago, major senders of children are creating narrow
restrictions and regulations, and some are cutting off the flow of
adopted children altogether.13 These restrictions are to some degree
warranted, as intercountry adoption procedures are not without
imperfections.
A. Perils and Pitfalls of Intercountry Adoption
Countries such as China and Romania are generally reluctant to
participate in intercountry adoption for two main reasons. First, there
7. Shelley Sperry, Politics of Adoption, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Jan. 2008 (providing the
example of Russia, which began allowing intercountry adoption after the conclusion of the Cold
War).
8. Liu, supra note 4, at 192 (“International adoption is practiced predominantly in nations
where not only the families, but the countries themselves, cannot care for their own children.”).
One notable exception is China. John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Superpower Economy (Heritage
Foundation, WebMemo No. 1762 Dec. 28, 2007) (describing China’s economic growth and
stating “China is an economic superpower”).
9. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS ET AL., CHILDREN ON THE
BRINK 2004: A JOINT REPORT OF NEW ORPHAN ESTIMATES AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
3 (July 2004), available at http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNACY333.pdf.
10. Id. at 7.
11. See generally Lindsay Carlberg, Note, The Agreement Between the United States and
Vietnam Regarding Cooperation on the Adoption of Children: A More Effective and Efficient
Solution to the Implementation of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption or Just
Another Road to Nowhere Paved with Good Intentions?, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 119
(2007).
12. See generally Richard A. Posner, Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 59 (1987).
13. Sperry, supra note 7.
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is a concern for children.14 Although adoption is essentially a
transaction between two parties, the human element of adoptions
produces considerations and concerns that differ from those of other
commercial transactions. More specifically, trafficking and corrupt
parties are major concerns. Second, some countries and international
organizations—notably the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF)—are concerned about possible losses of cultural identity
and believe children should be raised domestically, not abroad, to
ensure that children understand their heritage.15 This second
perspective seems to view children as a natural resource that should
be protected. Also, a country that is known to have a mass exodus of
its children may be concerned about its international reputation,
especially when it is trying to portray itself as a modern, developed
country. For example, a country’s international reputation may be
important if the country is trying to gain entrance into the European
Union or bidding to host the Olympics.
1. Trafficking
First, intercountry adoption is desirable because in its absence a
corresponding black market is unavoidable. Although restrictions on
intercountry adoptions aim to curb illegal trafficking of
16
children, some couples want children so badly that they buy children
on the black market where they are readily available.17 In these black
markets, “baby brokers” commonly exist, charging fees to birth
mothers (or, as has been suggested, people posing as birth mothers
but who are passing off someone else’s child for quick cash), and
placing children into the adoption market.18 Black markets suffer
from “an obvious lack of law and oversight,” and in black markets
19
children are “sold as a commodity.” To some potential parents who
participate in the black market exchange, the ends justify the means,
since the children will be provided with good homes and parents who
can support them.20
14. See infra Part I.A.1.
15. See infra Part I.A.2.
16. See Wendy Koch, Cuts in Foreign Adoptions Causing Anxiety in USA: Rules Protecting
Kids Create Barriers for Some, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 2008, at 1A.
17. Liu, supra note 4, at 190.
18. Laura Beth Daly, Note, To Regulate or Not to Regulate: The Need for Compliance with
International Norms by Guatemala and Cooperation by the United States in Order to Maintain
Intercountry Adoption, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 620, 624 (2007).
19. See id. (discussing the black market in Guatemala).
20. See id. at 624-25 (discussing the black market in Guatemala).
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Not all actors in the black market seek to act as an adoption
agency. Instead, vulnerable children may be exploited or abducted, a
problem that often occurs following emergencies, such as during the
2004 Southeast Asian tsunami.21 Children orphaned by such situations
are often exposed to “child trafficking, labor and sexual exploitation,
22
or recruitment as child soldiers.”
Ensuring that children are not exploited—either by being sold
into slavery or on the black market to desperate potential parents—is
certainly an admirable goal. The trafficking of children is a serious
problem that needs a serious solution. Yet, limiting intercountry
adoption may not be the appropriate solution to the problem of child
trafficking. As will be discussed later, disallowing intercountry
adoptions may threaten a child’s well-being in other dangerous ways,
including perpetuating life in substandard and even squalid
orphanages, increasing homelessness, and augmenting problems that
exploited children on the black market already face, such as
23
prostitution and enslavement. Nonetheless, the existence of the
black market and the possibility that children will be abused or
exploited are the main reasons why UNICEF believes that
intercountry adoption should be used only as a last resort when
children “cannot be placed in a permanent family setting in their
countries of origin.”24 The Hague Convention was enacted specifically
with the hope that child exploitation (including illegal trafficking)
could be stopped by regulating the countries that want to engage in
intercountry adoption.
2. The Threats of a Loss of Cultural Identity and International
Reputation
A second reason countries seek to limit intercountry adoption is
due to the potential loss of cultural identity or international
reputation. Since countries that place children up for adoption are
21. See EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION IN
EMERGENCIES: THE TSUNAMI ORPHANS 1 (April 2005), available at http://www.adoption
institute.org/publications/2005_Brief_ICA_In_Emergencies_April.pdf.
22. Id. at 2.
23. See infra Part III.
24. UNICEF, UNICEF’S POSITION ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, http://www.unicef.
org/media/media_41918.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2008) (“Over the past 30 years, the number
of families from wealthy countries wanting to adopt children from other countries has grown
substantially. At the same time, lack of regulation and oversight, particularly in the countries of
origin, coupled with the potential for financial gain, has spurred the growth of an industry
around adoption, where profit, rather than the best interests of children, takes centre stage.
Abuses include the sale and abduction of children, coercion of parents, and bribery.”).
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usually underdeveloped or developing, the exportation of children
may make a country feel as if it were admitting to the rest of the
world that it has a weak child and social welfare system and cannot
support its own children. For example, as China bid for and
subsequently began to prepare for its hosting duties of the 2008
Summer Olympics, it may have been concerned that its international
reputation would be tarnished if the international community thought
that China was unable to care for many of its children and was instead
exporting them to America and other wealthy countries.25 Since many
countries view children as a valuable resource and a treasure, China
may have felt that its pride would have been at stake should it have to
admit that Americans were raising thousands of Chinese children in
American culture.
A child’s right to its cultural identity and heritage is also a
concern. “[C]hildren’s advocates of all stripes agree that when
possible, children should be raised by their own families and in their
own cultures.”26 So, a child who is raised in a country other than the
one into which he or she was born may lose appreciation of his or her
27
cultural heritage. While many adoptive parents seek to educate their
child on where they came from, other parents may choose not to do
so. However, this potential loss of cultural identity may not be as
serious of a concern when the alternatives are considered; a child who
is homeless or in an orphanage in his or her country of origin still may
be deprived of other basic human rights.28
II. THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention seeks to protect children by creating
procedural safeguards that will ensure that children will be moved
25. Elisa Poncz, Note, China’s Proposed International Adoption Law: The Likely Impact
on Single U.S. Citizens seeking to adopt from China and the Available Alternatives, 48 HARV.
INT’L L.J. ONLINE 74, 77 (2007), available at http://www.harvardilj.org/online/112 (last visited
Mar. 26, 2009).
26. Pat Wingert, When There’s No Place Like Home: Children’s Advocates Can’t Agree on
How Much to Emphasize Intercountry Adoption as a Solution, NEWSWEEK (INT’L ED.), Feb. 4,
2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/105531.
27. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1265-66 (4th ed.
2004) (“Race matching policies in adoption are also justified under a ‘collective group rights’
theory. If large numbers of African American children are being adopted by white families,
many will grow up lacking a black racial identity.”).
28. Poncz, supra note 25, at 81 (“The proponents of international adoption argue that
without international adoption these children will live out their lives in orphanages and on the
streets. The opponents of international adoption argue that corruption robs sender-countries of
their dignity and their most precious resource—the children themselves.”).
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through the adoption process in a lawful manner. It was designed “to
encourage adoption at home rather than abroad, . . . to end the
international baby trade[,]” and “to restore order, transparency and
decency to the adoption process.”29 Still, the Hague Convention does
30
not reject intercountry adoption. It does, however, prize domestic
adoption over intercountry adoption, noting that “intercountry
adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child for
whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of
origin.”31 Because of this bias toward domestic adoption, the Hague
Convention mandates certain procedures dealing with intercountry
adoption in any country that is party to the Hague Convention. In
particular, countries must create national “central authorities” that
oversee all intercountry adoptions.32 Restructuring internal child
welfare systems to conform with the Hague Convention will not
happen overnight. Whether this problem with the Hague Convention
will only have short-term effects remains to be seen.
The Department of State is designated as the central authority of
the United States.33 Many countries, such as the United States, have
state-based adoption systems, not federal ones, so implementation of
34
a “central authority” may take some time. It is likely that some
children’s best interests in the short term are being negatively
35
affected as a result of the delay in implementation. Furthermore,
whether the Hague Convention will be successful in the long run
remains to be seen, but critics of the Hague Convention have noted
that its “rules may prove so rigorous and indiscriminate that they will
severely curtail international adoption as a vital escape route for
children in troubled regions.”36 The central authorities for both
receiving and sending countries are required, among other things, to
37
prepare reports on each child considered for adoption.

29. Mac Margolis, Who Will Fill the Empty Cribs: International Adoptions are on the
Decline, Despite Growing Demand and an Endless Supply of Orphans, NEWSWEEK (INT’L ED.),
Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/105530.
30. Hague Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
31. Id.
32. Id. ch. III.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 14911(a)(1) (2006).
34. See Margolis, supra note 29.
35. Id. (“In the long run, the Hague convention could prevent abuses. But in the short
term, imposing tougher standards, screening child and would-be foster families more closely and
eliminating for-profit foster care may mean longer stays in orphanages for many children.”).
36. Id.
37. Hague Convention, supra note 1, arts. 15, 16.
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The United States took more than a decade to ratify the Hague
Convention. It may be unreasonable to assume that other countries
that have far less resources than the United States will ever be able to
comply with the Hague Convention.38 The United States has far more
resources at its disposal and experience at implementing policy than
most countries, and it still took years to meet the standards of the
Hague Convention. Some countries are put between a rock and a
hard place: they are unable to comply with the Hague Convention yet
face international criticism for allegations of trafficking. Such
countries may view the best solution to be simply disallowing
39
intercountry adoption, as Vietnam did. Children in these poor,
unstable countries then remain in orphanages, on the streets, or with
families who cannot support them. For the Hague Convention, an
international effort to ensure that children’s best interests are
realized, this is an unwanted side effect. Another unwanted and
related side effect of the Hague Convention is that countries, in their
efforts to comply with the Hague Convention and also encourage
domestic adoption, may enact regulations so strict that children end
up paying the price. For example, China’s new regulations guarantee
that some people will be unable to adopt from China; at the same
time, China has not proven that children will be readily adopted
domestically and not languish in an orphanage.40
A. The “Best Interests” Standard
Both those for and against intercountry adoption claim they have
children’s “best interests” at heart.41 The “best interests” standard is
commonly used in matters involving children. Under this standard,
the child’s best interests are used to determine what course of action
should be taken. The Hague Convention references the best interests
42
standard several times. The United Nation’s Convention on the
43
Rights of the Child confirms that in adoption proceedings “the best
interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration.”44
38. Carlberg, supra note 11, at 136 (“By failing to create an immediate incentive for
countries to ratify the Hague Convention, sending countries are permitted to put off compliance
until they become more stable, which could result in indefinite non-compliance.”).
39. See infra Part III.C.
40. See infra Part III.A.
41. See infra Part III.A.
42. Hague Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., arts. 1, 4, 16, 21, 24.
43. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (Nov.
20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC].
44. Id. art. 21.
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Similarly, in the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating
to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to
Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally the
United Nations again affirms that the best interests of the child are
45
paramount in any adoption decisions.
Some organizations and diplomats have used this standard to
limit the availability of intercountry adoption. In particular, UNICEF
has repeatedly stated that it is usually not in a child’s best interests to
46
be adopted by a family in another country. Also, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child states that “intercountry adoption may be
considered as an alternative means of child’s care, if the child cannot
be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable
47
manner be cared for in the child’s country of origin.” This seems like
quite a high threshold to overcome; intercountry adoption is painted
as an unattractive option, a last resort that should be avoided if at all
possible. The Declaration on Social and Legal Principles has a slightly
softer, albeit vaguer, view, stating that the “primary aim of adoption
is to provide the child who cannot be cared for by his or her own
parents with a permanent family” and that when “considering
possible adoption placements, persons responsible for them should
select the most appropriate environment for the child.”48
However, prizing domestic adoption far above intercountry
adoption may threaten other rights of a child and, thus, may not
always be in a child’s best interests. The preamble of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child says that a child should “grow up in a
family environment.”49 If there is low demand for domestic adoption
and intercountry adoption is not encouraged, then a child who is
raised in an orphanage or on the street certainly is not, in any sense,
being brought up in a “family environment.” Children have the right
50
to be protected against violence, abuse, neglect, and maltreatment.
As mentioned above, children who are bought and sold on the black
market may indeed face abuse, and as will be discussed shortly, even
45. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of
Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and
Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/85 (Dec. 3, 1996) [hereinafter
Declaration].
46. See CRC, supra note 43, art. 21.
47. Id.
48. Declaration, supra note 45, arts. 13-14.
49. CRC, supra note 43, pmbl. See also Declaration, supra note 45, arts. 13-14 (stating that
a child should be placed within a permanent family unit).
50. CRC, supra note 43, art. 19.
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children in orphanages are often neglected, abused, or maltreated. If
children are left to fend for themselves, they are often exposed to
violence or exploitation. Children have the right to “an adequate
standard of living,”51 and it is unclear if such a standard of living is
available to those children whose countries would rather have them
adopted domestically or remain inside the country than be sent to
adoptive parents in a foreign country. Many critics of UNICEF’s
policy believe that, while it has noble roots, the policy lacks empirical
support regarding its efficacy. Thus by limiting access to willing
adoptive families, a limitation which could deny children their basic
rights by condemning them to life in substandard conditions,
UNICEF is not acting with the best interests of the child in mind.52
B. Restricting Intercountry Adoption May Not Protect the Best
Interests of Children
Although the Hague Convention purports to promote the best
interests of the child, the standards of the Hague Convention (in
combination with the regulations of individual countries) do not
adequately protect children. Because domestic families might not
adopt their domestic orphans at a greater rate than willing foreigners,
orphaned children usually face one of two alternatives if they are
unable to be adopted internationally. If old enough, they can live on
the street and try to survive on their own. Otherwise, children will
likely spend their formative years in orphanages. Homelessness and
orphanages will briefly be discussed first, and then the issue of supply
and demand will be addressed.

51. Id. art. 27.
52. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 4, at 189 (“A large number of the world’s children lead lives
void of opportunities to develop pursuant to the specifications of the U.N. Declaration of the
Rights of the Child. Obviously, situations where children find they must steal or sell their bodies
in prostitution generally do not permit them to maintain a life in the manner that the U.N.
mandates. For example, it is clear that orphaned children surviving on the streets, or in
orphanages under squalid conditions, are not living at the U.N.-articulated standards. Ironically,
a large number of families who are willing to provide for these children have been denied access
to them.”); EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 7 (“In countries with
established practices of intercountry adoption, there is no evidence to suggest that banning the
practice halts such abuses as the trafficking of children . . .. Imposing blanket bans in response to
reported abuses relegates children legitimately in need of homes to additional years in
institutions, or worse.”).
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1.

Undesirable Alternatives to Intercountry Adoption:
Homelessness and Orphanages
53
Romania stopped allowing intercountry adoption in 2001. In
2006 an estimated 1,500 Roma children were living on the street in
54
that country. UNICEF has noted that such children are “at risk of
becoming victims of trafficking (both internationally and nationally),
mostly for sexual exploitation, and for begging in the case of children
with disabilities.”55 Compared to other countries, “Roma children are
over-represented both in terms of abandoned children, children living
56
in institutions, street children, and children in conflict with the law.”
Abandoned children who live on the street lack identity cards and are
therefore unable to attain public services.57 They are often
58
malnourished and in ill health and have likely been sexually or
59
physically abused. A study of all street children in Romania
indicated that about one-fifth of the children had never been to
60
school and about one-third of them were illiterate. Again, Romania
has closed its doors to foreigners seeking to adopt.61 Clearly,
Romania’s decision to stop foreign adoption has left some of its
children on the streets in conditions that are arguably worse than
what they would have experienced had they been able to be adopted.
But the conditions off the street, in orphanages, may not be much
better.
About one hundred years ago America started moving away
from the use of orphanages and instead put a premium on ensuring
62
that children were adopted. President Theodore Roosevelt was
dismayed with the “Dickensian conditions” of the nation’s
63
orphanages. In 1909, he “convened the first White House
Conference on the Fare of Dependent Children and established as a
matter of national policy that, where possible, homeless children

53. Sperry, supra note 7.
54. UNICEF, CHILDREN ON THE BRINK 2006: A FOCUSED SITUATION ANALYSIS OF
VULNERABLE, EXCLUDED, AND DISCRIMINATED CHILDREN IN ROMANIA 12 (2006)
[hereinafter, UNICEF, CHILDREN ON THE BRINK 2006].
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 56.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 56-57.
60. Id. at 57.
61. Sperry, supra note 7.
62. Williamson, supra note 4, at 36.
63. Id.
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should be placed in permanent adoptive homes.”64 The Conference
declared that “[h]ome life is the highest and finest product of
civilization. It is the great molding force of mind and character.
Children should not be deprived of it except for urgent and
65
compelling reasons.” Orphanages in America are almost unheard-of
today.66 Admittedly, other factors may have influenced this result,
such as the development of the foster care system and fewer children
67
being put up for adoption.
Orphanages still exist in other countries, and their conditions do
not seem to be much better than the “Dickensian conditions” that
68
spurred Roosevelt into exploring alternatives. It is believed that in
Europe and Central Asia over one million children live in
69
orphanages. UNICEF has recognized that “[m]any children are
placed unnecessarily and for too long in institutions, where they
receive less of the stimulation and individual attention needed to
grow to their full potential.”70 Visitors to Chinese orphanages have
observed developmental delays and signs of a failure to thrive among
the children.71 In addition, other countries have orphanages that
clearly compromise a child’s best interests. In Russia, for example,
parents with HIV/AIDS are pressured to institutionalize their
children.72 Once placed in an orphanage, children with HIV/AIDS are
“often separated from other children, leading to further
73
stigmatization.” Again, studies show that children in these
orphanages may have “difficulty forming meaningful, lasting
relationships” due to “[i]nadequate staff-to-child ratios, the lack of
training for caretakers, and high staff turnover.”74 In 2007, the nongovernmental organization Human Rights Watch singled out both
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. JOHN E. B. BYERS, CHILD PROTECTIONS IN AMERICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
77 (2006) (“The number of children in orphanages peaked during the Great Depression at
roughly 144,000. Following World War II, orphanages declined, and by 1980, Americans viewed
orphanages as a thing of the past.”).
67. See generally Williamson, supra note 4.
68. Id.
69. WORLD VISION, CHILDREN IN CRISIS, http://meero.worldvision.org/sf_childrenincri
sis.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
70. UNICEF, CHILD PROTECTION INFORMATION SHEET: CHILDREN WITHOUT
PARENTAL CARE (2006).
71. See generally id.
72. UNICEF, ENHANCED PROTECTION FOR CHILDREN AFFECTED BY AIDS 16 (2007).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 15.
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Liberia and India for their orphanages with “substandard”
75
conditions. This data indicates that institutionalized orphaned
children face serious physical, mental, and emotional challenges.
Since children in orphanages are often left without many of their
basic needs, placing children in orphanages does not support the best
interests of children. The “Dickensian” conditions do not seem to be
going away anytime soon.
2. Supply and Demand: Domestic v. Foreign Demand
It should be noted that any statistics mentioned very well might
be lower than the actual number of children who are abandoned,
living in institutions, or living on the street, since not all countries
have transparent child welfare systems. It is hard to track exactly
what is happening to abandoned children and what the effects of
adoption systems are upon them. What is clear, however, is that such
restrictions are ensuring that many fit foreign parents will be unable
to provide a permanent home to abandoned children and,
simultaneously, are not addressing the problem of a lack of potential
domestic parents willing to adopt. Countries such as China that are
enacting limits on intercountry adoptions claim that there are not
76
enough children to meet the demand. But, as the case studies below
demonstrate with children still in orphanages and still on the streets,
this claim seems highly untenable.
What China really may be struggling with is the capability to
77
process all the adoption applications they receive. This is a
bureaucratic, administrative problem. A better system is needed, not
only to streamline and expedite the adoption process, but also to
ensure that all adoptions are legal and ethical. But if the actual supply
of children is not lower than the demand then it seems unnecessary
and against a child’s best interests to cut off intercountry adoption or
restrict it to an unwarranted degree. Even if there were enough
domestic homes in which to place abandoned children, studies
indicate that that might not be the best solution. A study conducted
by UNICEF noted that putting an abandoned child with their

75. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2008: EVENTS OF 2007, 134, 277 (2008).
76. Pam Belluck & Jim Yardley, China Tightens Adoptions Rules for Foreigners, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/us/20adopt.html.
77. Margolis, supra note 29.
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extended families or with families who cannot support them might
78
not be in that child’s best interests.
One example of a country with low domestic demand is
Romania. Its moratorium on intercountry adoption proves how little
domestic adoption is occurring in an abandoned child’s country of
origin and how harmful restrictive policies can be. Numerous studies
support the position that children are not being adopted domestically
79
to any great degree in Romania. A study conducted in 2000 reported
that while a significant number of abandoned children were placed
with extended family or in foster care, only 0.22%— 43 children—
were adopted domestically.80 Romania cannot seriously argue that
there is such a high domestic demand for children that intercountry
adoption is unneeded when less than one percent of abandoned
children are being adopted domestically. Other countries have
realized just how low domestic demand is compared to foreign
demand for abandoned children. In 1988, South Korea banned all
intercountry adoptions. Like China and the 2008 Olympics, it was
under fire in the lead-up to the 1988 Olympics being held in Seoul.81
In 1994, the ban was lifted when the South Korean government
realized that, since the 1994 ban, “domestic adoption did not increase
enough to offset international adoption.”82 Romania and other
countries that have banned intercountry adoption should learn from

78. UNICEF, ENHANCED PROTECTION FOR CHILDREN AFFECTED BY AIDS, supra note
72, at 15 (“While these traditional community coping mechanisms are often protective, studies
have shown that children in these arrangements are less likely to receive an equal share of
household resources compared to biological children. This is particularly the case when
resources are scarce. Children living in households without either parent are also less likely to
attend school and are at greater risk of exploitation, abuse and neglect.”).
79. See infra Part III.E.
80. UNICEF, CHILDREN ON THE BRINK 2006, supra note 54, at 11 (“[T]he overall change
due to reform has affected the type of care, but has not resulted in a dramatic decline in the
number of children in need of placement measures.”).
81. Eun Jung Cahill Che, Adoption by Foreigners Can Be Fine, INT’L HERALD TRIB.
(Paris, Fr.), Aug. 23, 2001, http://www.iht.com/articles/2001/08/23/edcahill_ed3_.php.
82. Id. It should be noted that currently South Korea is trying again to encourage domestic,
rather than intercountry, adoptions with campaigns aimed at ending the stigma attached with
having an adopted child and also with monthly allowances to adopting families and health
benefits for the children. Norimitsu Onishi, Korea Aims to End Stigma of Adoption and Stop
‘Exporting’ Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/10/09/world/asia/09adopt.html. It is also important to note that “last year, for the first time,
more babies [in South Korea] were adopted by South Koreans than foreigners.” Id. If domestic
demand now truly trumps foreign demand then perhaps any restrictions that South Korea seeks
to impose should not be met with the same apprehension as restrictions and bans already in
place in other countries.
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South Korea’s experiences and admit that their current supply of
abandoned children outweighs any domestic demand.
C. Short Term and Long Term Effects of the Hague Convention
If there is a silver lining to the dark cloud of restrictive adoption
policies, it is that there may be a rise in the adoption of children who
were previously marginalized. Because potential parents are
sometimes restricted in intercountry adoption, they may adopt older
83
children and children with special needs from their own countries. In
addition, because of restrictions in intercountry adoptions in Asia and
the former Soviet Union, traditionally two popular regions for
adoption, potential parents may look to adopting children in other
parts of the world. There is a need for adoptive parents for children in
Africa, “where AIDS, political instability and ethnic violence have
taken their toll on families.”84
Besides the adoption of children who in the past were often not
adopted, the Hague Convention has the potential to end the abuse
and exploitation of trafficked children. But in the short term it is
likely that children will feel detrimental effects of countries trying to
comply with the Hague Convention or trying to shed their reputation
as a country that has a black market in babies. As countries like
Guatemala and Vietnam cease intercountry adoptions to try to
comply with the Hague Convention and address issues of child abuse
and exploitation, it is likely that many of the children who may have
previously been adopted by foreigners will not be adopted
domestically and, instead, will be without a permanent home and
family.
The long-term effects of the Hague Convention are obviously
speculative at this point. Admittedly, it could end the illegal baby
trade, which is certainly in the best interest of children. But in the
long run, children may still be neglected, abused, or exploited—the
threat to children’s best interest may just be within their country of
origin, not in an adoption system. Romania’s policy has demonstrated
that children are not being adopted in sufficient numbers
85
domestically to offset the need for intercountry adoption. Children,
who are in ready supply, are not being protected by domestic policies
that limit or eliminate all foreign demand for those children. If not

83. Koch, supra note 16.
84. Margolis, supra note 29.
85. See discussion infra Part III.E.
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adopted, abandoned children will most likely remain in orphanages or
on the streets.
III. CASE STUDIES: COUNTRIES RESISTING
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS
The following are examples of countries that either have closed
themselves off completely to intercountry adoption or have enacted
very strict requirements. Policies that have a complete ban on
intercountry adoption, such as Romania’s, make it so that no one
outside of the country is able to adopt. Policies that are very
restrictive, such as China’s new regulations, create huge obstacles to
intercountry adoption. Examining the effects of such restrictions may
help shed light on the possible effects of the Hague Convention.
A. China
86
China’s one-child policy makes domestic adoption unlikely. Not
surprisingly, its orphanages are mostly filled with girls.87 China’s
orphanages were notorious in the 1990s for their miserable, almost
inhumane conditions. Human Rights Watch found that an orphan had
only a fifty percent change of surviving beyond one year in 1989.88
Furthermore, the mortality rate at Chinese orphanages was “far
89
higher than [the rate] documented in any other country,” due to
neglect, lack of medical training among the staff, and even deliberate
90
deaths. At some orphanages the deaths were the result of “an
apparently systematic program of child elimination in which senior
medical staff played a central role.”91
Despite these conditions, some of these orphanages were even
praised by the Chinese governments as “national model[s] for the
care of abandoned and disabled children” and received financial
support from the government.92 Human Rights Watch did a follow-up
report in response to China’s criticisms of the earlier report and
found even more egregious behavior on the part of the Chinese

86. Anne Thurston, In a Chinese Orphanage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1996, at 30.
87. Id.
88. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEATH BY DEFAULT: A POLICY OF FATAL NEGLECT IN
CHINA’S STATE ORPHANAGES 2 (1996).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 7.
92. Id. at 5.
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government. It found that the Chinese government does not always
make relevant information publicly available and in fact may try to
93
conceal evidence of abuses. The report also found that the funding
that the government did provide was inadequate to ensure that each
child was provided with an appropriate amount of food, clothing, and
medical treatment.94 These conditions have led one observer to note
that in China “abandonment is all too often tantamount to
95
infanticide.”
Moreover, these children were not even being readily adopted.
While not impossible, it is unlikely that many of these children will
find homes domestically if the one-child policy continues to exist. Yet
China, through the China Center for Adoption Affairs (CCAA) also
recently enacted restrictions, effective May 2007, for foreigners
96
seeking to adopt. Adoption is limited to married heterosexual
couples between the ages of thirty and fifty.97 They must be
“physically and mentally fit” and, among other conditions, cannot
have AIDS, blindness in either eye, hearing loss, paralysis, severe
facial deformation, schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, or a body mass
98
index of forty or more. They must have fewer than five children
under the age of eighteen, and neither partner can have a significant
criminal record.99 These new regulations will prevent many people
from being able to adopt from China. It is predicted that populations
of “liberal urban centers” in America, which often have single
individuals or non-traditional couples (such as gays and lesbians)
100
seeking to adopt, will be hit hard by these restrictions. The CCAA
wants potential adoptive parents to be the “cream of the crop”
according to their standards.101 Critics of the new regulations are also
concerned about the body mass index, depression, and anxiety
102
requirements, as they are “common diagnoses here in America.”
93. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHINESE ORPHANAGES: A FOLLOW-UP 7-9 (1996).
94. Id. at 6.
95. Id. at 4.
96. OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY SPECIFIC INFORMATION
FOR CHINA (Jan. 23, 2009), http://adoption.state.gov/country/china.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2009).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Patricia Wen, China’s Policies Lead to Drop in Bay State Adoptions—Local Economy
Also a Factor, BOSTON GLOBE, May 1, 2006, at A1.
101. Belluck & Yardley, supra note 76.
102. Id. Major depressive disorder is one of the leading causes of disability in the United
States, affecting about 14.8 million American adults each year. About 6.8 million American
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Disagreement exists about whether such restrictions are
necessary. Some see the new requirements as reasonable and even
necessary to weed out less desirable parents since, as the Chinese
government has reportedly claimed, there is an “enormous spike in
applications by foreigners, which has far exceeded the number of
available babies.”103 Others question the motives of the Chinese
government as well as any statistics they may proffer. While China
may have wanted to ensure that its children would be raised by
Chinese parents and not overweight, depressed Americans, it is also
likely that China was aware of how the export of its children would be
viewed by the international community, especially in light of its
hosting the 2008 Summer Olympics.104 Critics of China’s new
regulations doubt China’s claim “that there simply is not an excess
supply of children waiting in institutions for adoption” because of
“various accounts of steady levels of Chinese babies in orphanages.”105
In reality, domestic adoptions may not be enough to make sure that
106
Chinese orphans will be adopted. Even if there are fewer children
to be adopted, this may be caused by “troubling social practices” such
as gender-specific abortions.107 Accordingly, the numbers the Chinese
government provides may not be completely reliable. If children are
not being adopted domestically, then it is also likely that they are
languishing in orphanages with conditions probably similar to those
described above—conditions that do not seem to meet the best
interests standard.
B. Guatemala
While China’s restrictions seem to be going too far, Guatemala
does not go far enough to provide regulations to protect children.
Guatemala is known for baby trafficking and its thriving black market
and lacks sufficient safeguards in this area. In recent years Guatemala
was one of the top sender countries of adopted children to America.108
adults suffer from generalized anxiety disorder. Any one of these individuals would be denied
the opportunity to adopt from China. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE
NUMBERS COUNT: MENTAL DISORDERS IN AMERICA, available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov
(last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
103. Belluck & Yardley, supra note 76 (reporting the comments of American adoption
agencies that had been briefed by Chinese officials).
104. Poncz, supra note 25, at 77.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 76.
107. Id.
108. Daly, supra note 18, at 624.
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According to some studies, it was second only to China, which is
surprising due to the huge population gap between the two
109
countries. The large numbers of adopted children sent to the United
States is due to the lack of regulation and oversight by the
110
Guatemalan government over intercountry adoption. This lack of
regulation and the abuses that take place seem to make Guatemala
the poster-child for the type of adoption reform the Hague
Convention seeks to attain. As of the fall of 2008, the Guatemala’s
National Council on Adoption (CNA) announced it would not review
any new adoption cases while it worked on establishing guidelines to
bring the country into compliance with the Hague Convention.111
Although CNA anticipated compliance by January 2009, by all
accounts, that goal has not been met.112 It is unclear when full
compliance in Guatemala will actually be achieved.
Compliance—especially timely compliance—is certainly a good
thing, but the costs, even if they may be short-lived, of halting
intercountry adoption should be considered. Many wonder if
compliance really has to be all-or-nothing. For example, some argue
that the U.S. Intercountry Adoption Act (IAA), which implements
the Hague Convention, allows the United States to waive some
requirements of the IAA if doing so is in the “interests of justice” or
113
to “prevent grave physical harm.” A child who is homeless or is in
an orphanage, the argument continues, is in grave physical harm and
is an affront to justice.114 There seems to be no immediately apparent
reason why Guatemala could not have a similar philosophy.
One proposed alternative to the mandates of the Hague
Convention would be for a temporary system that would allow for
adoptions to continue during the transition between an almost
completely unregulated system and one in full compliance with the

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY SPECIFIC INFORMATION
FOR GUATEMALA (Mar. 24, 2009), http://adoption.state.gov/country/guatemala.html. At the
time of publication, the Guatemalan guidelines were not finished.
112. Id.
113. Intercountry Adoption Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14952(b)(1) (2000).
114. Daly, supra note 18, at 630. “[T]he best interests of Guatemalan children must be
placed at the forefront of the United States’ concern, and terminating adoptions is not in their
best interests. To enforce laws at the expense of children who require homes is not justifiable
when alternatives exist for accommodating Guatemala’s specific and rare situation within the
international context.” Id. at 626.
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Hague Convention.115 While this sounds ideal, proponents do not fully
discuss the nuts and bolts of this alternative system. The only thing
that is clear is that it is likely that during any transition period there
exists the real threat of children who otherwise could be adopted
ending up on the street or in orphanages. There is statutory authority
under the IAA for the United States to allow for continued
intercountry adoption during a transitional period; however, since it is
Guatemala, not the United States, that has temporarily cut off
adoptions, it is not clear whether such an alternative solution will be
embraced.
It is also not clear whether any alternative solution will be
effective in the long run. If Guatemala’s new regulations become as
strict as China’s, then allowing continuing adoption during the
transition period when regulations are being developed will do little
good. Guatemala’s compliance with the Hague Convention, as well as
any documented effects upon children during the transition, will be
extremely helpful in evaluating whether the Hague Convention is
ultimately in children’s best interests.
C. Vietnam
Like Guatemala, Vietnam has a history of lax, if not nonexistent, intercountry adoption regulations.116 In 2005, the United
States and Vietnam entered into a bilateral agreement to encourage
117
Vietnam to develop safeguards for its adoption system. According
to the terms of the agreement, both parties were to see that
“appropriate measures should be taken [by both parties] under their
respective laws to prevent and deal with actions of adoption abuse
involving the exploitation of children for labor, sex, illicit gain, and
other infringements on a child’s lawful rights and interests.”118
Unfortunately, the agreement expired on September 1, 2008.119

115. Id. at 627-28.
116. Carlberg, supra note 11, at 144-45 (“One reason for this [lack of oversight] is that
Vietnam is a war-torn and poverty-stricken country that has a weaker adoption infrastructure;
therefore, it is more susceptible to corruption. . . . With neighboring China’s strict and wellestablished adoption rules, adoptive parents have been turning to Vietnam, where the rules are
much more lenient.” (footnote omitted)).
117. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam Regarding Cooperation on the Adoption of Children, U.S.-Vietnam, June 21, 2005,
Temp. State Dep’t No. 06-10, 2005 WL 3826041.
118. Id. art. 4, ¶ 2.
119. OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY SPECIFIC INFORMATION
FOR VIETNAM (Oct. 16, 2008), http://adoption.state.gov/country/vietnam.html (last visited Mar.
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The United States is concerned that Vietnam still has not
ensured that children will not be exploited or abused, noting that field
investigations found “serious adoption irregularities, including forged
or altered documentation, cash payment to birth mothers . . . coercion
or deceit to induce the birth parent(s) to release children to an
orphanage, and children being offered for intercountry adoption
without the knowledge or consent of their birth parents.”120 The
Vietnamese Department of International Adoptions (DIA) no longer
processes adoption applications, as it cannot do so in the absent of an
agreement.121 As in the case of Guatemala, the question remains what
will happen to children when intercountry adoption is completely
closed off, even if the suspension is only temporary.
Vietnam’s experience demonstrates another important point
about the Hague Convention—it requires vast in-country resources.
Countries like Vietnam may be reluctant to conform to the Hague
Convention because of the “the cost and the organization entailed to
122
implement and conform to the Hague Convention.” Vietnam lacks
the strong, organized government that is needed to develop
123
regulations. If a country like Vietnam does not have the resources—
both in terms of finances and experience—to care for its own
abandoned children, then it also probably does not have the resources
necessary to conform to the Hague Convention.124 Vietnam highlights
one of the biggest concerns regarding the Hague Convention: while
the Hague Convention’s ideals are commendable, it may be just too
hard for poorer countries to implement. If Vietnam’s non-compliance
means that the United States, a party to the Hague Convention, is
unlikely to adopt from Vietnam, then what happens to the orphaned
4, 2009). Nothing new has happened since the expiration of this agreement, and adoption
remains closed until a new agreement is signed between the parties. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Carlberg, supra note 11, at 146.
123. Id. at 147 (“Implementation and start-up costs would be extraordinarily high and would
be almost impossible to attain in under-developed countries without continued foreign aid.”
(footnote omitted)).
124. Id. (“Most sending countries like Vietnam culturally oppose dependence on
intercountry adoption to raise their children, yet they continue to engage in the practice out of
necessity. If Vietnam had the resources, it would likely devote that money to caring for its
orphans in order to end the shameful practice of baby trafficking rather than expending those
resources on implementing the Hague Convention. Unfortunately, Vietnam does not have the
financial resources needed to do either of these things. Instead, it has decided to take the
passive approach of putting off compliance for an extended period of time; realistically, it may
never finalize compliance, thereby undermining the goals of the Hague Convention.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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and abandoned Vietnamese children? In a poor country like
Vietnam, it is wishful thinking to believe that they will be adopted
domestically in any great number.
D. Russia
Russia may present a forecast of how Vietnam’s “temporary”
suspension of intercountry adoption will affect children, since Russia
temporarily closed off intercountry adoption in 2007.125 Although the
Russian government tried to encourage its own citizens to adopt, this
effort proved unfruitful, as “very few Russian families want to adopt
orphans because they’re often seen as sick or somehow damaged.”126
So, if Russia’s “temporary” solution during this transitional period
when Russia was trying to develop and implement safeguards was to
persuade Russians to adopt Russian orphans, it appears that such a
solution was ineffective.
Many children remained in orphanages, including special closed
institutions for children who were considered mentally or physically
disabled. Children in such institutions were twice as likely to die than
127
Russians are also
children in “regular” Russian orphanages.
unlikely to adopt a child with HIV/AIDS, which is a growing problem
128
in that country, and abandoned children with HIV/AIDS in Russia
are likely to be stigmatized or neglected at any orphanage or
129
institution in which they are placed. Potential foreign adoptive
parents, who have the resources and desire to care for a child with
special needs, may be more willing than potential domestic adoptive
parents to adopt a disabled child. Eager to be parents, they are often
amenable to adopting and raising a child that will need extra care and
attention. But if the doors are closed to such prospective parents,
then it appears the child will most likely not be part of an adoptive
family at all; instead the child likely will be raised in an orphanage.
Like the Chinese, who are unlikely to adopt because of the one-child
policy, and the Vietnamese, who are unlikely to adopt due to lack of
financial means, Russians also seem unlikely to adopt their own
125. Gregory Feifer, Russia’s Halt on Adoption Spotlights Conditions, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
Apr. 25, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyid=9810880.
126. Id. (noting that roughly half of all children adopted in Russia each year “are taken in by
foreigners”).
127. Id.
128. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POSITIVELY ABANDONED: STIGMA AND
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HIV-POSITIVE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN IN RUSSIA 1-2
(2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/russia0605.pdf.
129. Id.

WORTHINGTON_FMT2.DOC

2009]

4/27/2009 2:15:48 PM

THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN

581

children at such a rate that would render foreign adoption
unnecessary. Thus, children, especially those with special needs who
are stigmatized by Russian society, seem to be affected negatively
during any suspension of intercountry adoption.
E. Romania
Of the countries discussed in this note, Romania may best
demonstrate how cutting off foreign adoption can negatively affect
children. In 2001, the Romanian government imposed a ban on
intercountry adoption.130 The main motivation behind this was that
Romania wanted to gain acceptance into the European Union, which
had “conditioned Romania’s acceptance to the Union on its need to
reform its adoption system.”131 Such an ultimatum was not entirely
unwarranted, as Romania had a booming baby trade. The trade grew
out of the government’s push for adoption in the 1990s instead of
filling state-run orphanages with abandoned children (who were
abundant
when
the
government
banned
sex-education,
132
contraceptives, and abortion).
Since the implementation of the ban, some children have been
133
“forced back on destitute families.” Many other children have been
placed in orphanages. According to a UNICEF report, in 2006 there
were an estimated 77,866 abandoned children who were in public or
private care.134 Of these children, 28,516 were living in institutions.135
Only 474 were placed in any sort of adoption system.136 Many
abandoned children are homeless and are left to live and work on the
137
streets of Romania. The effects of the 2001 moratorium are not
unsurprising, as Romania’s weak social welfare system is simply “not
equipped to handle the number of abandoned children.”138 Lifting the
ban on intercountry adoption would help Romania “ease the strain

130. Grainger Laffan, Romania’s Policy of Emptying Its Orphanages Raises Controversy,
331 BRIT. MED. J. 1360, 1360 (2005).
131. Daly, supra note 18, at 630-31. See also UNICEF, CHILDREN ON THE BRINK 2006,
supra note 54, at 137 (“European integration began to influence the child care and child
protection system, as this became a political criterion for EU accession.”).
132. Laffan, supra note 130, at 1360.
133. Id.
134. UNICEF, CHILDREN ON THE BRINK 2006, supra note 54, at 37.
135. Id. at 42.
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
138. Che, supra note 81, at 6.
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on [its] state institutions.”139 While domestic adoption should be
encouraged, Romania should realize that, like China, not enough
140
domestic demand exists to outweigh adoption by foreigners.
The United States has been vocal in its concern over Romania’s
ban on intercountry adoptions. Reform certainly was needed for
141
Romania’s adoption system, but at the same time, the United States
argues that a complete ban on intercountry adoption is to the
ultimate detriment—not the benefit—of children, noting that the
regulations are “so restrictive” that they have “ended up harming the
142
very children and families it was ostensibly designed to protect.”
Abandoned children in Romania “continue to face long term[sic]
institutional care” because there is large disparity between the
“number of Romanian children in need and the relatively smaller
number of Romanian families looking to adopt domestically.”143
While the United States recognizes that Romania was concerned
about its acceptance to the European Union, the U.S. Department of
State believes that “there is no European Union law or regulation
restricting intercountry adoptions to biological grandparents or
requiring that restrictive laws be passed as a prerequisite for
accession.”144 In 2005 and 2006, the House of Representatives and the
Senate both passed resolutions calling for the “[g]overnment of
Romania to amend its child welfare and adoption laws to decrease
barriers to adoption, both domestic and intercountry”145 since the
“number of Romanian children adopted domestically is far less than
146
the number abandoned.” While Romania did need adoption reform
to end corrupt practices, its moratorium has left thousands of
abandoned children without a family. The United States has
recognized this fact, and perhaps international pressure, including

139. Id.
140. Id. Romania’s former president Ion Illiescu acknowledged this in 2001 when he
questioned who in Romania “will adopt the abandoned children ‘when we have an average
salary of $100.’” Id.
141. See Maura Harty, Assistant Sec’y of State for Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State,
Testimony at Comm’n on Sec. & Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), Sept. 14, 2005
(transcript
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/law/legal/testimony/testimony_2635.html)
(“Romania’s previous adoption laws failed to provide child welfare protections, and reform of
the system was imperative.”).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. S. Res. 359, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted).
146. H.R. Res. 578, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted).
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pressure from the United States and the European Union, will lead
Romania to rethink its current practices.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO REMEDY THE DRAWBACKS
OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The objectives of the Hague Convention are commendable. All
children deserve to be protected from exploitation. But such
protection should not be at the expense of other children; instead of
being adopted, these children will spend their youth homeless on the
street or in orphanages. Countries can achieve the goals of the Hague
Convention without making such sacrifices. First, countries and
international organizations should rethink their views on intercountry
adoption and consider whether restricting adoptions, with all its
possible baleful effects, is a desirable alternative. Second, parties to
the Convention must figure out a way to address the harms that occur
during transitional periods when countries are developing and
implementing regulations.
A. Countries and International Organizations Should Critically
Examine their Positions on Intercountry Adoption
UNICEF, a leader among non-governmental organizations
geared towards protecting and promoting the rights of children,
should carefully consider its position on intercountry adoption and
whether that position is ultimately in children’s best interests. Also,
countries and other international organizations should consider
whether domestic adoption should always be prized over intercountry
adoption. While problems that arise in the context of intercountry
adoption certainly should be addressed, such concerns may also be
inflated.
First, there is the concern over a loss of cultural identity, lineage,
and heritage. Within the United States, federal law “prohibits the use
of racial criteria in adoption placement.”147 Studies of American
children adopted by parents of a different race have reported that
such adoptions present no real threat to a child and that “transracial
adoptees do not deny their racial identification nor, for the most part,
do their adoptive parents.”148 The “colorblind” domestic adoption
policy of the United States recognizes that “so long as the number of
minority children needing permanent homes exceeds the number of
147. Williamson, supra note 4, at 37.
148. Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoption, 3 ADOPTION 104, 117 (1993).

WORTHINGTON_FMT2.DOC

584

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

4/27/2009 2:15:48 PM

[Vol 19:559

minority families able to accept them, transracial placement is a
149
resource that should not be ignored.” Otherwise, the alternative
may leave many vulnerable children without permanent families. The
parallel between such an outcome and what is occurring in countries
such as China cannot be ignored; “[c]ritics compare such policies [that
place a premium on domestic rather than foreign adoption] to those
promoted in the 1970s by black American social workers, who argued
that only African-American families could ethically adopt black
babies. As a result, many minority children spent most of their
childhoods in state care.”150 Cultural identity should not be
disregarded, but what value is cultural identity to a child who is
homeless or grows up in an orphanage?
Second, there are the concerns, such as those voiced by
UNICEF, over trafficking and other related abuses and exploitations,
but critics of UNICEF argue that the organization “plays up rare
151
cases of abuse and corruption.” Furthermore, “no evidence [exists]
to suggest that banning the practice [of intercountry adoption] halts
such abuses as the trafficking of children.”152 UNICEF should
determine whether its policy has the actual affect of limiting
trafficking. Likewise, countries that have bans or very strict
regulations should examine the practical effects of curbing
intercountry adoption on children. Finally, if UNICEF is truly
committed to promoting the best interests of children, then perhaps it
should examine the underlying causes of abandoned children. Many
countries are too poor to provide for vulnerable children and their
families or may lack infrastructure and resources. Other policies of
individual countries may also be contributing factors to the more than
143 million orphans. China’s one-child policy means both that
undesirable babies, such as girls, are abandoned and that the Chinese
are unlikely to adopt domestically in any great number. Similarly,
Romania’s policies on birth control and sex-education created a rise
in unwanted pregnancies and abandoned children. If countries want
to take care of their own children and not have them adopted
overseas, they should carefully consider the implications of any policy
that affects children.

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Wingert, supra note 26.
Id.
EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 7.
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B. Countries that are Party to the Hague Convention Should
Implement Safeguards During Transitional Periods so that the
Best Interests of Children are Promoted
A major flaw with the Hague Convention is that it either did not
contemplate or decided not to address the problems that occur when
countries completely shut off their intercountry adoption pipeline as
they try to comply with the Hague Convention (e.g., Guatemala).
Alternatives to a complete cessation of intercountry adoption should
be embraced. Temporary solutions should be used during transitional
periods so that children continue to be adopted. While it may seem
like western imposition of conditions on others, developed countries
should be actively involved in helping less-developed countries
comply with the Hague Convention. Countries like the United States
have the resources and experience to assist poorer countries in the
development of effective laws, regulations, and adoption systems.
For countries that have had a dark history of intercountry
adoption abuse, such as Guatemala, heightened oversight may be
necessary to protect any children who are up for adoption during a
transitional period. During this passage of time between signing and
ratifying the convention, developed countries with resources should
be called upon to assist other countries in setting up infrastructure to
comply with the Hauge Convention. Under the Hague Convention,
signatories are to work together through their “central authorities”
during the adoption process.153 Thus, countries should aim to work
together during transitions to develop good standards and practices.
So instead of closing off its adoption pipeline, a country may have to
make a case-by-case analysis, individually scrutinizing each child’s
situation and determining that there has been no exploitation. This
task may be time-consuming, but if the concerns of the critics of
intercountry adoption are exaggerated, then it also may be very
fruitful.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Critics of the Hague Convention and of countries’ policies
regarding intercountry adoption (e.g., China’s new regulations)
sometimes take an extreme view. Because the potential exists for
children to be harmed under such policies, they are looked at with

153. Hague Convention, supra note 1, chs. III, IV.
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contempt.154 Such an extreme view may not be needed. Certainly
there is something to be said for the Hague Convention’s effort to
end the trafficking, abuse, and exploitation of children, but the Hague
Convention does not do enough to ensure that regulations and
standards created by countries are narrowly tailored and no more
restrictive than necessary. Policies such as China’s are too strict.
Children in such countries are not being adopted domestically, and
homelessness and institutionalization cannot be in their best interests.
Countries and international organizations, if they are truly
concerned with protecting children, should also be careful how they
vocalize their opinions on intercountry adoptions. A country that has
children languishing in decrepit orphanages should be criticized,
especially if they are trying to gain status in an organization (e.g.,
Romania with the European Union) or international favor (e.g.,
China with the Olympics). But when countries and organizations
criticize intercountry adoption too harshly by, for example, likening it
to “exportation” and insinuate that countries who do not have
domestic demand should be viewed critically, then it is no surprise
that countries feel pressured to cut off intercountry adoption
altogether. Instead, what is needed is an effort to encourage
regulation.155
The Hague Convention is a good step in the right direction, but
until international organizations like UNICEF reconsider their
positions on intercountry adoption and countries reconsider their
moratoriums on adoption, children’s best interests may be
compromised. Those that are party to the Hague Convention should,
if they are able, seek to provide oversight to countries who are
lagging behind in attaining compliance, and work with them to have
adoptions be processed on a case-by-case basis, rather than having
countries cut off adoption all together. If it takes a village to raise a
child, it will take a global effort to make sure that a child is also raised
in a permanent family.

154. Poncz, supra note 25, at 82 (“If . . . these regulations prohibit even one child from being
adopted, then in my opinion they will have failed.”).
155. As the case studies indicate, there is no denying that many countries need regulation.
See supra Part III.

